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Trump and Truth
Greg Weiner
When GeorGe WashinGton convened his first cabinet meeting, the seats around the table were occupied by the likes of Secretary 
of State Thomas Jefferson, the scholar-statesman from Virginia, an ac-
complished architect, horticulturalist, and future president of the 
American Philosophical Society, whose writing credits included the 
Declaration of Independence and Notes on the State of Virginia. 
Next to him was the Treasury secretary, Alexander Hamilton, author 
of the bulk of the Federalist Papers, the foremost American contribu-
tion to the Western political canon. Henry Knox, learned in Latin, 
Greek, and French, self-taught in military history, and a general in 
the Revolution, served as secretary of war. It says something about the 
heft of the group assembled that perhaps its least distinguished mem-
ber was Edmund Randolph, the attorney general, a graduate of the 
College of William and Mary who both introduced the Virginia Plan 
that became the template for the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 and 
served on the Committee of Detail that converted it into a first draft of 
the Constitution.
Shortly after Donald Trump arrived in Washington for his inaugura-
tion, he declared to a luncheon at his Trump International Hotel that 
“[w]e have by far the highest IQ of any cabinet ever assembled!” Setting 
aside whether intelligence is the proper measure of political compe-
tence — might he have aspired to assemble the wisest or most prudent 
cabinet in history? — it is no insult to such public servants as his secre-
tary of state, Rex Tillerson, or Treasury chief Steve Mnuchin to say that 
Trump’s statement was almost certainly false. More intelligent than a 
line-up that included Jefferson and Hamilton? Smarter than Lincoln’s 
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“team of rivals,” in Doris Kearns Goodwin’s formulation — William 
Seward, Salmon Chase, Edwin Stanton, and Edward Bates? 
Trump’s claim, reflecting his propensity for the superlative form, elic-
ited some groans and a touch of ridicule, but mostly knowing dismissals. 
Of course, there are no official records, as there ought not to be, on 
the intelligence quotients of cabinet members, so his statement was not 
objectively falsifiable. But others — the murder rate was the highest in 
decades, he saw Muslims in New Jersey celebrating 9 / 11 — have been. 
Trump claimed at an inaugural ball that “even” the press had called 
the crowd that assembled for his swearing-in “massive” when in fact 
the coverage the entire day had emphasized the smallness of the turn-
out compared with the crowds for his predecessor. The next day he 
announced to CIA employees that he had seen a million to a million-
and-a-half people at the inauguration, which, by multiples, outstripped 
all crowd estimates. The press, he now complained, had only shown 
empty fields. Standing before the CIA memorial wall as a backdrop, op-
posite which are etched the words “ye shall know the truth,” he said the 
assembled masses had extended to the Washington Monument. They 
had not. There are pictures.
This manner of falsehood is trivial compared to questions of war and 
peace. But all of Trump’s distortions raise a serious question: Does the 
integrity of language matter in politics?
the FantasizinG oF Politics
Trump is often said to have ushered in an era of post-truth politics. This 
is to give him more credit than he has earned. He is the culmination, not 
the origination, of this trend, for which the hard left, and especially the 
academic left, now awash in apoplexies over the president’s distortions, 
can largely blame itself. If Trump is the first postmodern president, it is 
because the left has spent decades championing a postmodernism that 
made language an instrument of will. 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan knew. Forty-one years nearly to the day 
before Trump was elected to the White House, Moynihan delivered his 
famed address to the United Nations decrying the General Assembly’s 
resolution equating Zionism with racism. There is a symmetry, or rather 
asymmetry, between the events.
Reflecting later on the address in his book A Dangerous Place, 
Moynihan, a fierce liberal critic of the illiberal left in America and 
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abroad, said he objected not merely to the vilification of Israel but 
also to the corruption of language involved in the appropriation of 
the word “racism”: “I had wanted to speak to the issue of language; 
to say that to preserve the meaning of words is the first responsibility 
of liberalism.”
In that task, liberalism — or, rather, leftism — failed, and that is no 
small part of the reason Trumpism triumphed. Of this, the left seems as-
tonishingly unaware. On Inauguration Day, a group of anthropologists 
protested Trump with nationwide “teach-ins” featuring, with no evident 
sense of irony, readings of Michel Foucault’s Society Must Be Defended.
In the lectures compiled in that book, Foucault characterizes truth 
as a weapon of power:
In order to characterize not just the mechanism of the relation-
ship between power, right, and truth itself but its intensity and 
constancy, let us say that we are obliged to produce the truth by 
the power that demands truth and needs it in order to function: 
we are forced to tell the truth, we are constrained, we are con-
demned to admit the truth or to discover it. Power constantly 
asks questions and questions us; it constantly investigates and re-
cords; it institutionalizes the search for the truth, professionalizes 
it, and rewards it.
Foucault claims merely to be telling a story about the use of truth, but 
the implications of that story naturally devalue it. He proceeds to say 
that the philosopher “telling the truth, recounting the story, rediscov-
ering memories and trying not to forget anything, well, that person 
is inevitably on one side or the other: he is involved in the battle, has 
adversaries, and is working toward a particular victory.” 
“Discourse,” Foucault says, employing the word now pervasive in the 
academy, is always “perspectival.” The moment a claimant to truth seeks 
a particular and especially an empowering end, truth is no longer uni-
versal. “The truth is, in other words, a truth that can be deployed only 
from its combat position, from the perspective of the sought-for victory 
and ultimately, so to speak, of the survival of the speaking subject him-
self.” There is consequently “a basic link between relations of force and 
relations of truth” in the Western tradition, and thus the association of 
truth with “neutrality” is “being dissolved.”
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It is difficult to see how, on this account, truth could be grasped or 
asserted in any way other than manipulation. By Foucault’s reasoning, 
objective truth, if it exists, is inaccessible to real human experience.
This is misguided, for several reasons. One, unless Foucault was onto 
something that Aristotle missed, is the inescapable relationality of hu-
man beings, our inherently political natures. But to say that human 
beings are relational is not to say that truth is relative. Rather, Aristotle 
derives man’s political essence from that which makes us unique among 
creatures, which is logos, the capacity of speech attached to reason: 
For, as we assert, nature does nothing in vain; and man alone 
among the animals has speech [logos]. The voice indeed indicates 
the painful or pleasant, and hence is present in other animals as 
well; for their nature has come this far, that they have a percep-
tion of the painful and pleasant and indicate these things to each 
other. But speech serves to reveal the advantageous and the harm-
ful, and hence also the just and the unjust.
This is inherently an interpersonal, political capacity. The isolated indi-
vidual has no need for logos. He who can share nothing or needs nothing “is 
either a beast or a god.” Few of these walk among us, which means that the 
atomized individual is incapable of arriving at truth except in community 
with others. Given that the pursuit of truth is inherently a political activity, 
it is inseparable from the relationships that Foucault says distort it.
Of course, politics as an Aristotelian phenomenon is wholly different 
from and nobler than Foucault’s mere imposition of power. But it is inher-
ently associated with the notion of authority. In a complex society governed 
by a division of labor, we also have no choice but to recognize the authority 
of both eminent individuals and those with particular expertise. 
That is not to say the individual surrenders his capacity of judgment. 
One substantial exercise of judgment is deciding to which authorities one 
should defer, and with respect to what and under what circumstances 
to do so. The point is that not all of us share comparable expertise in all 
the vast areas of life that a complex society must govern and on which 
we seek to have opinions.
We cannot all expect to have comparably informed views of topics 
ranging from medicine to metaphysics. Yet these are realms in which 
truth, even if unattained, exists. This does not mean truth must be 
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rendered merely technical or scientific. Nor does it mean governance is 
reducible to rigid truths cast in harsh blacks and whites. The progres-
sive aspiration to scientific legislation notwithstanding, politics is much 
more often a matter of prudential judgment than scientific precision. 
Aristotle recognized as much in observing that the good and bad and 
just and unjust, while objective qualities, required the social capacity of 
logos to be approached.
But such judgment is often rooted in facts, and, even where facts 
are in dispute, judgment is conducted and conveyed in words. In his A 
Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America, 
John Adams likely (and characteristically) overstated the case in decry-
ing Marchamont Needham’s “[p]oetry and mystics,” which is to say 
oratorical flourish, as poorly suited to the study of politics. “The sim-
plest style, the most mathematical precision of words and ideas, is best 
adapted to discover truth, and to convey it to others, in reasoning on 
this subject,” he asserted.
James Madison was more accurate in noting that words are an un-
avoidably imprecise medium, something he identified in Federalist 
No. 37 as a source of difficulty in constitutional drafting: “When the 
Almighty himself condescends to address mankind in their own 
language, his meaning, luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and 
doubtful by the cloudy medium through which it is communicated.” 
That is all the more reason to preserve words rather than merely sur-
render to their use as pure instruments of will. 
Yet this surrender is the continuation of a trend dating at least to the 
1960s left, whose “great debasement of language” and “fantasizing of 
politics” Moynihan abhorred:
Upper-class lying — that the men in jail are political prisoners, that 
the fatherless child is happier, that the welfare system is a con-
spiracy to keep the proletariat passive — is destroying standards of 
discourse. The language of politics grows more corrupt. We have 
graduated a demi-generation of students who appear lost to reality. 
We are beginning to encounter middle-of-the-road politicians who 
will seemingly say anything. We approach a fantasized condition.
As Steven Hayward has noted, it is a condition that the far left, whose 
influence is spreading to mainstream liberalism, is poorly equipped 
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to resist given its long project to undermine the integrity of truth 
claims. The rapid diffusion and acceptance of transgender ideology, 
and the stigmatization of those who question it as bigots, illustrates 
the use of language as will. The bifurcation between “sex” and “gen-
der” — the former held to be a biological reality and the latter a social 
construct — is a remarkably sudden etymological innovation that has 
swept through society from its source in the intellectual left in an as-
tonishingly brief time. 
The mutation of gender pronouns from terms reflecting objective, 
recognizable realities in the concrete world to expressions of individual 
will — with the extraordinarily individualized nature of the willing be-
lying the claim that there is anything “social” about the construction 
involved — is but one example of the effervescence of language.
Its rapid-fire acceptance among mainstream and even partisan jour-
nalists, artisans whose craft depends on the integrity of language, is 
especially disturbing. A time traveler from a generation ago would read 
high-minded journalistic accounts of today’s disputes over bathroom 
access in vain to understand why there is any controversy over “girls” de-
scribed with the feminine pronoun wishing to use women’s bathrooms 
and locker rooms. Only occasionally do the stories disclose, and then 
only in passing and often at the end, that the individuals involved are bio-
logically male. Even the story on the Fox News website about President 
Obama’s commutation of Chelsea Manning’s sentence for disclosing 
troves of classified documents described the leaker as “she.”
Yet it is far easier to call someone “male” or “female” as a matter of 
objective reality than it is to say President Trump “falsely” described his 
inaugural crowds as “massive.” This is not a wholly surprising devel-
opment. The press has long displayed a congenital allergy to objective 
truth, though, ironically, in the name of objectivity. Now, in the era of 
Trump, they are disarmed.
seriously or liter ally
In Against All Hope, his memoir of Fidel Castro’s gulag, Armando 
Valladares recounts, in excruciating detail, two decades of torture and 
neglect, including having human feces sprayed into his mouth and 
caked onto his skin for so long that fungi grew and had to be scraped 
off with the top of a tin can. He was once marched into a lake of sewage 
in which one of his fellow prisoners nearly sank and drowned. He was 
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beaten with everything from chains to truncheons to bayonets. He was 
fed maggot-infested remnants of rotted food.
When Castro died in late 2016, the New York Times gamely offered in 
a caption on its webpage that Castro was “seen as a ruthless despot by 
some and hailed as a revolutionary hero by others.” This is what passes 
for objectivity. It is the idea that any claim must be held equal and stated 
on equal terms with any other. There is no objective sense, however, in 
which Castro was a “hero” (defined by the Oxford English Dictionary 
as someone “distinguished by the performance of courageous or noble 
actions”) any more than there is an objective sense in which Donald 
Trump saw Muslims rioting in celebration in Jersey City on the after-
noon the Towers fell.
Fair enough, the Times buried the word “hero” beneath the obfuscat-
ing mists of the passive voice — “was seen as” — but it similarly qualified 
what Castro most certainly was in any objective sense, provided words 
have fixed meanings: both ruthless (OED: “feeling or showing no pity or 
compassion”) and a despot (“an absolute ruler of a country”). 
Yet what passes for fairness is telling two sides to stories that do not 
have them. There is a circle at work. The press must do this for the sake of 
credibility; if it had more credibility, it could simply state facts. There are 
attempts to do this now, desperately, as the Trump administration chokes 
off the media’s access to the White House. Reporters describe Trump’s 
statements as “false,” “exaggerated,” and “misleading.” One headline in 
the New York Times accused Trump of repeating a “lie.” Yet the press 
had never done so with other figures before. The irony is thick: It is the 
media’s discomfort with objective truth that disqualifies it from being 
believed when it calls Trump on his violations of objective truth now.
Of course, that politicians fib is neither shocking nor new. Hillary 
Clinton seemed as incapable of acknowledging the truth about her email 
scandal as Bill Clinton, dissecting and brutalizing the meaning of “is,” 
had been about his intern scandal. Trump’s practice is more insidious. It 
is a steady deflation of the currency of language through serial exaggera-
tion, gratuitous superlatives, and, yes, reflexive distortion.
How literally should Trump be taken, especially when such penchants 
are well known? The journalist Salena Zito incisively said Trump’s sup-
porters took him seriously but not literally, whereas his critics took him 
literally but not seriously. There is a great deal to that, and a great deal 
that it reveals. 
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It is neither possible nor prudent for every word in politics, any more 
than for every word in romance, to comply with the criterion of literal 
truth. But something is amiss with respect to the unique role words play 
in politics. When the best that can be hoped for on the international 
stage is that the world will not take the president of the United States at 
his word, because he systematically aggrandizes language and says things 
that are not meant to be taken “literally,” serious questions arise.
Barack Obama was right when he said that the words presidents use 
can start wars or move markets. That is a useful tool that ought both to 
be preserved and to be sparingly employed. Yet Trump uses language 
so promiscuously — he tweets with exclamation points and all capital 
letters even now, as president of the United States; he pledged in his 
inaugural address to “eradicate” radical Islamism “completely from the 
face of the earth,” something no serious person thinks possible — that it 
is likely the next chief executive will have to rebuild the linguistic cred-
ibility of the office. Indeed, one hopes that will be necessary, because the 
alternative would be that the world spends Trump’s presidency taking 
him both seriously and literally. One or the other will have to go.
The distinction between the literal and the serious also forces an 
artificial cleavage between speech and deed. A common refrain is that 
Trump’s speech is atrocious but his policies are defensible. Accepting 
this premise — which entails accepting a degree of protectionism, presi-
dentialism, and other practices that have traditionally been anathema to 
conservatism — there is still the fact that policies receive their meaning, 
expression, and justification through speech. If speech lacks meaning, 
policies are imposed through patent will. 
That is why the credibility of the office of the president is not all 
that is at stake. The presidency itself is already an inflated office in the 
constitutional system. Its credibility is vital, but the deeper threat is to 
the integrity of language itself.
the currency oF rePublicanism
The 1960s left did not invent the notion of language as an instrument of 
will, nor was Foucault the first to theorize it. That distinction belongs, 
perhaps, to the ancient Greek sophist and rhetorician Gorgias, immor-
talized in the Platonic dialogue whose title bears his name. In it, his 
interlocutor Socrates distinguishes between “conversation,” his method, 
and “oratory.”
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Gorgias boasts about the use of language as a weapon of power that 
causes others to act as one wills by inducing a sense of conviction in 
them about the just and unjust. “[O]ratory,” he announces to Socrates, 
“embraces and controls almost all other spheres of human activity.” Yet 
even Gorgias, falling into one of Socrates’ legendary traps, claims the 
power of oratory can be used well or poorly — that is, rightly or abu-
sively. For Foucault, the presence of power is itself inherently a stigma of 
misuse. The issue is what happens to political conversation when words 
are no longer attached to objective meanings in the observable world. 
This is why Moynihan called the defense of language “the first re-
sponsibility of liberalism” — that is, liberalism in the classical sense, the 
kind of liberalism whose institutions maintain predictability and free-
dom, including the freedom of self-government. Words are the currency 
of republicanism. They are the liberal alternative to the imposition of 
pure power. And words with meaning are the alternative to the im-
position of sheer will through the manipulation Gorgias described. 
Foucault, in short, is wrong. Words are not a means of coercion. They 
are the alternative to it.
In his History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides, recounting the 
revolution at Corcyra and the subsequent rebellions it unleashed across 
the region, understood the collapse of language as a symptom of the 
collapse of civil society:
So bloody was the march of the revolution, and the impres-
sion which it made was the greater as it was one of the first to 
occur. Later on, one may say, the whole Hellenic world was con-
vulsed. . . . Words had to change their ordinary meaning and to 
take that which was now given them. Reckless audacity came 
to be considered the courage of a loyal ally; prudent hesitation, 
specious cowardice; moderation was held to be a cloak for un-
manliness; ability to see all sides of a question, inaptness to act 
on any.
The Judeo-Christian tradition for this reason sharply emphasizes the 
integrity of words. In Jewish thought, the importance of speech is sig-
naled in the first lines of Genesis when it is the mechanism God uses for 
creation. Throughout Genesis, human words have the power to insti-
gate realities, as in the case of Isaac’s blessing, which, though mistakenly 
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given to Jacob rather than Esau, sticks because it has been spoken. The 
Christian Gospel of John begins by paralleling Genesis: “In the begin-
ning was the Word” — significantly, in the Greek, Logos. In Catholicism, 
the Logos is the second person of the Trinity, which makes whatever has 
being intelligible through words.
In politics, which is not a static affair, language does not merely re-
veal realities. It generates them. That is true in a double sense. One is the 
use of language by public figures speaking to one another, the public, 
and the world. Some deception and wordplay are, of course, naturally 
involved in statecraft and negotiation. But when the leaders of coun-
tries, or of the branches of our government, or of the Republican and 
Democratic caucuses, reach a bargain, they ultimately do so through the 
medium of language. They may lie, of course, and their credibility and 
thus effectiveness may suffer. But if the underlying language itself has 
no meaning, and is broadly understood legitimately to have no mean-
ing because it has been deflated into nothingness, the exchange is not 
possible in the first place.
As Thucydides notes, this also makes the practice of public virtues 
impossible. If moderation cannot be distinguished from cowardice — a 
confusion Burke would later predict amid the ravages of the French 
Revolution as well — it can be neither exhibited nor recognized. If reck-
lessness is confused with courage, it is incited.
Thus the second sense in which language matters: the inhibition of 
political conversation among the people themselves. We are apt to make 
mistakes when our language lacks clear meaning. As George Orwell 
wrote in his seminal essay “Politics and the English Language,” the sub-
text of which is that to control words is to control the levers of power, 
“But if thought corrupts language, language can also corrupt thought.” 
This inability to converse is especially troubling in a polarized time. 
Americans are retreating not just behind partisan lines but also into 
private and disparate realities. The era of three major networks may 
have warranted complaints about bias, but at least political conversa-
tion could occur within a broad consensus about facts. Dispute thus 
pertained to their interpretation and implications.
Today 47% of Americans who identify as “consistently conservative” 
call Fox News their main source for news about government and poli-
tics, according to a survey from the Pew Research Center. Consistently 
liberal voters turn to a greater diversity of sources, but only because a 
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greater diversity of sources appealing to them are available: CNN, NPR, 
MSNBC, and the New York Times.
Social media accelerates the self-selection of news. According to the 
same survey, 75% of consistently or mostly conservative Americans say 
they see Facebook posts about politics that mostly or always align with 
their views. Liberals should not mount a high horse: They are likelier, 
Pew found, to hide from, block, “de-friend,” or stop following someone 
because of a political post. Some 69% of mostly or consistently liberal 
Americans have done so. Perhaps more disturbing, the more fixed peo-
ple become in their views, Pew found, the less likely they are to speak 
with those with whom they disagree.
In this environment, plausibility is the new truth. Call it the new 
postmodernism. It was on display when Bill O’Reilly, author of a tract 
proffering the thesis that Ronald Reagan was mentally compromised 
while serving in the White House, all but came through the camera at 
George Will, whose column had discredited the book. O’Reilly began 
the interview by attacking Will for not calling him before criticizing his 
book, then proceeded to defend himself for not talking to principals in 
the Reagan administration before writing the book because they had 
“skin in the game.” For “proof” that Will was “lying,” O’Reilly cited 
Edmund Morris’s “biography” of Reagan, which was in fact a widely 
panned fictionalized memoir.
O’Reilly raged, willing the words to mean what he wanted. Will 
remained cool. Later, O’Reilly attacked Will again for having criti-
cized Trump’s pressuring of Carrier Corporation to maintain jobs in 
the United States. “Drop the personal stuff,” O’Reilly admonished Will. 
“Tell the truth.” The truth was that Will had not said anything personal. 
The day after Trump’s inauguration, Fox declined to renew Will’s con-
tract. O’Reilly remains on the air.
Meanwhile, on MSNBC, host Rachel Maddow piled up no fewer 
than four adverbs when she announced that then-President-elect Trump 
“blatantly, and overtly, bluntly, simply lied” when he said Russian 
hacking had not influenced the outcome of the election. Yet President 
Obama’s White House had said the election results “accurately reflect 
the will of the American people.” 
She had previously said the Koch brothers had funded an effort to 
require mandatory drug tests for welfare recipients in Florida. They had 
not. She claimed John Kasich signed an Ohio law requiring transvaginal 
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ultrasounds for women seeking abortions. The law specified the ultra-
sounds had to be performed externally.
Devotees of such hosts are often not concerned with the truth so 
much as the plausibility of their claims. An alternative explanation for 
any phenomenon — which the media is always pleased to supply in the 
name of fairness, regardless of its truth — is adequate to provide cover 
for one’s pre-existing political views. Honest inquiry after truth is a 
thing of the past. And why not? The left has, for decades, told us it did 
not exist. 
For that matter, a consistent conservative or consistent liberal ex-
posed only to O’Reilly or Maddow might never know their claims had 
been debunked. The evidence indicates such a conservative and liberal 
would probably not encounter each other anyway. If they did, how 
would they communicate? Words would simply be instruments of po-
litical will.
loGos and Will
This, ultimately, is why it matters that President Trump misleads. It mat-
tered that Hillary Clinton did too, but Trump won and now bears the 
burdens and accountability of leadership. Nor is it enough to say, as his 
advisor Kellyanne Conway did in his defense, that it is necessary to look 
at “what’s in his heart” rather than “what’s come out of his mouth.” We 
do not have direct insight into each other’s hearts. Isaac did not bless 
Jacob with his heart; he used words. The mechanism we use to convey 
our inner thoughts and feelings is speech. There is no alternative save 
force. Consequently, preserving the meaning of words matters.
It matters if, first, Aristotle was right that logos is the means of reveal-
ing the good and the bad and the just and the unjust and, second, if 
the good and the bad and the just and the unjust are matters of beauty 
and enduring importance. It is especially unbecoming of conservatism, 
then, to excuse Trump’s abuse of language. If Russell Kirk was right in 
two of his 10 conservative principles — that “there exists an enduring 
moral order” and that “conservatives are chastened by their principle of 
imperfectability” — then presumably the defense of that order requires 
an ongoing pursuit conducted through the medium of speech. If he was 
right in a third principle — adherence to “custom, convention, and con-
tinuity” — words are also the relevant medium, for they are the means 
of conveying tradition with consistent meaning.
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This is not to say language and meanings do not evolve. They do. But 
even in that case, words retain meanings when they are spoken. There 
is a difference between language that evolves by decentralized percola-
tion, gradually over time, and a sudden, top-down emptying out of the 
content of words altogether.
This is not to apologize, either, for liberal sanctimony. Trump is not 
an aberration. It is the argot of the left as expressed, inter alia, in the ellip-
tical phrases of Foucault that dignified with theory precisely what Trump 
claims more crudely: that language is no more than will, merely power 
translated into words. The relativism long emanating from the academy 
leaves an institution to which we should above all be able to look for the 
pursuit of beauty and truth unable to speak in objective terms for either. 
If there is no objective truth, how is it possible to say Trump lied?
 Foucault, of course, was ultimately wrong in another, more impor-
tant sense. Words are not instruments of power. The destruction of 
words is an instrument of power. Orwell understood this. “You think, 
I dare say,” Winston’s friend Syme tells him of the coming edition of 
the Newspeak dictionary in 1984, “that our chief job is inventing new 
words. But not a bit of it! We’re destroying words — scores of them, 
hundreds of them, every day.”
No serious person believes President Trump, like the rulers of 
Oceania, has embarked on an insidious program to undermine the lan-
guage to inhibit resistance. That too, would credit him excessively. The 
academic left can justly be accused of a deliberate effort to diminish the 
integrity of truth and language. The president seems, instead, to suffer 
from a sort of compulsion to exaggerate and distort, from a kind of 
defect of character with respect to the truth.
The point, rather, is that this compulsion, when expressed repeat-
edly by a president of the United States, is consequential. Presidents 
can help to normalize once-aberrant behavior. They are neither clergy 
nor saints, but neither are they disembodied policies. The integrity and 
credibility of the office is not wholly separable from the character of 
its occupant. Most problematic, the devaluing of the currency of re-
publicanism — that is, logos — strips politics of the nobility of the good 
and the bad and the just and the unjust. All that is left standing is will. 
Perhaps it is not coincidence that — speaking as he does of winners and 
losers, the strong and the weak — will is the president’s forte.
